Abstract-Data sharing among multiple parties becomes increasingly common today, so is the potential for data leakage. As required by new data protection regulations and laws, when data leakage occurs, one must be able to reliably identify the leaking party. Existing solutions utilize watermark technology or data object allocation strategy to differentiate the data shared with different parties to identify potential leakers. However the differentiation loses its effectiveness under several attacks, including injecting noise into the data copy to weaken the differentiation, or denying the reception of certain shared data. Worse yet, multiple parties might collude and apply a set of operations such as intersection, complement, and union to the shared dataset before leaking it, making leaker identification more difficult.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data sharing becomes increasingly common today; for example, it becomes a common practice to outsource data analysis to professional third-party suppliers to assist decision making and market forecasting. At the same time, the potential unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information like Personally Identifiable Information (PII) [19] also increases. As the society becomes increasingly online, data confidentiality becomes a major concern. New regulation and laws, such as Europe's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [9] and California's Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [6] have come into existence for data protection, especially for PII and other identifying information, and violators can be fined up to 4% of their annual worldwide turnover according to GDPR [29] . Therefore reliable leaker identification in data leakage is a key enabler for the enforcement of new regulations.
The leaker identification problem in data sharing can be described as follows: a data owner (called the sender) shares its data with a number of agents (called receivers), where both sides agree that the shared data should never be disclosed to any third party. When a data leakage happens, offenders must be identified. A number of solutions to this leaker identification problem have been developed in recent years. At this time, the basic approach is to differentiate the datasets received by different receivers in the data sharing process. For example, the sender can allocate different portion of data across receivers [23] , [22] , [10] , [17] , or watermark the original data [2] , [28] , [25] , [31] before sharing it with each receiver. In this way, the sender can trace the leaker(s) by matching the data entries or checking the watermark of the leaked data.
However, the traceable differentiation loses its effectiveness in identifying leakers in some cases. To be more specific, the differentiation can be undermined, denied, or even abused by the attackers. (i) Attackers can undermine the differentiation through data manipulation (e.g., transformation and randomization on numeric attributes, dropping certain columns or rows); when there exists collusion among receivers, the differentiation can also be removed via data comparison (e.g., only leak overlapping data). (ii) The differentiation can be denied when there lacks the evidence of who has received what. (iii) The traceable information can also be abused by the sender to frame a receiver because the sender is aware of the differentiation.
The aforementioned issues motivate the following questions: 1) Since the existing approach to data differentiation can be spoiled by data manipulation or multiparty collusion, can we leverage the properties that are intrinsic in the shared data to build resilient leaker identification? 2) In order to prevent the sender from abusing its complete knowledge about data sharing, is there a way to prevent the sender from knowing the exact dataset it shares with individual receivers? 3) Can we develop a truth-preserving solution that prevents any party from lying or denying its actions in the event of a data breach?
To provide robust data differentiation that cannot be easily destroyed, denied or abused, we narrow down the problem scope and focus on the leakage of a specific category of datasets -those datasets that contain identifiable information.
In this paper we define identifiable information as any data that can be reliably associated to an object, e.g., a user, a product, or even a movie. Such information is carried in dataset's identifying attributes, which can be a phone number, an email address, a SSN, a product identifier, and so on. We believe that identifiable information is applicable to a wide range of shared datasets. There is an observable property of the dataset that contains identifiable information; once the identifiable information is removed or distorted, the data becomes anonymized and thus is less harmful to privacy when it is leaked.
In this paper, we propose ActShare, a data sharing system with reliable leaker identification in identifiable information leakage. Leveraging the property of identifiable information, ActShare allocates data objects by their identifying attribute across the receivers in a way that no single party is fully aware of the allocation results; at the same time, nobody can deny or lie about what data objects it has received. More specifically, the design of ActShare includes three basic components, answering the questions we raised above.
• Obliviously Allocating Objects by Identifying Attribute.
The sender organizes the raw dataset into data objects by data's identifying attribute(s) and then obliviously allocate data objects among receivers.
• Recording the Data Sharing into an immutable Ledger.
ActShare logs the whole process of data sharing into an immutable ledger. In the event of a data leakage, the ledger prevents any party from lying or denying what data objects have been transferred/received.
• Identifying Leakers based on Leakers' Knowledge When a leakage happens, ActShare can identify the leakers by reversely inferring the knowledge of the leaker(s) from the leaked data objects. A statistical test called the binomial test is utilized in ActShare's identification process.
We have implemented a prototype system of ActShare using 1-out-of-2 OT [7] and a private blockchain-based ledger. We evaluated ActShare by using a real-world dataset (which contains more than 100 million database rows that can be grouped into more than 17000 data objects). Our results show that, by checking a modest number of leaked data objects, ActShare obtains > 99.9% detection accuracy in the cases of (i) a guilty sender, (ii) a non-collusive guilty receiver, or (iii) a collusion of corrupted parties. After the allocation, each receiver obtains a dataset with a smaller size than the original data and in ActShare, the amount of received data is configurable.
Contributions The contributions of our work are twofold. 1) Leveraging the intrinsic property of identifiable information, we propose ActShare, a data sharing system with reliable leaker identification. To the best of our knowledge, ActShare is the first data allocation based leaker identification mechanism that is capable of identifying a guilty sender or a number of collusive leakers. 2) We implemented a prototype of ActShare and evaluated its effectiveness and impact of data allocation, showing that ActShare can accurately and undeniably detect collusive or non-collusive leaker(s).
Roadmap In the rest of the paper, we introduce the system model of our work in Section II and provide an overview of ActShare in Section III. After that, we introduce the design of each component in ActShare in Section IV, V, and VI. We evaluate our work in Section VII and discuss the tradeoff and configuration parameters in ActShare in Section VIII. We introduce the related work in Section IX and conclude our work in Section X.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this work, we consider the following problem. In a data sharing scenario, we assume there is a data sender S and N data receivers R 1 , R 2 , ...R N . The dataset being shared contains identifiable information. When the shared data is found unexpectedly (e.g., found in an unauthorized place), the goal is to identify the party/parties responsible for the leakage.
A. Threats Model
Using the data sharing scenario described above, we define the threats model as follows. From the system design perspective, we treat the unintentional and intentional data leakage as the same type of attack.
• Non-collusive Guilty Receivers We assume that a receiver can leak partial or entire set of its received data, and there may be more than one (non-collusive) receivers whose data is found from the leaked dataset.
• A Guilty Sender In the real world, the data sender may disclose its information unintentionally, e.g. due to dishonest employees or vulnerable company firewall. It is also possible that, when a leakage occurs, a sender might frame a receiver by using its complete knowledge about the data sharing.
• Multiparty Collusions Multiple parties may collude to gain advantages over the leakage identification system and escaping the responsibility. Specifically, corrupted parties can share their received dataset and leak the combination of their datasets to the public. With datasets from multiple parties, we assume the combination includes: (i) taking the union, intersection, or complement of any number of available datasets and (ii) randomly picking a number of data objects. We consider the cases when the sender also participates in the collusion. However, we assume the sender does not collude with all the receivers (i.e., no party is honest).
• Data Manipulation A malicious party can manipulate its data to circumvent the identification. Carefully-added noise keeps the value of the data while ruining the differentiation made on the data. Though approaches like content-based matching can be used to evaluate the likelihood between a manipulated dataset with the original one, it is hard to provide the evidence to prove the matching is right.
• Repudiation After data leakage, both the sender and receivers may deny the facts of what has been sent and received. For example, to escape the responsibility, a receiver who leaked the data may deny the receipt of a specific portion of the data and the sender may lie about what has been sent.
Specifically, in respect of the collusive leakage, our proposed system aims to capture each collusive receiver who contributed to the leakage. If a corrupted receiver R does not contribute to a leakage, that is, if other collusive receivers can have sufficient knowledge to make such a leaked dataset even without this R's participation, ActShare cannot identify R as a leaker.
B. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions when designing ActShare.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). We assume the existence of PKI. Specifically, we assume S and receivers have installed each other's public key certificates. This can be accomplished by the pre-configuration before the data sharing or through other out-of-band means.
Existence of Identifying Attributes. When it comes to a data that contains identifiable information, we assume there exists at least one identifying attribute in each data object. In ActShare, the identifying attribute will be used to distinguish each data object in the data.
Adequate Number of Data Objects We assume there are adequate data objects for the allocation so that each receiver can still get enough data objects. With insufficient number of total objects or with too many receivers, ActShare's allocation may violate the purpose of data sharing and the identification process may suffer from a high error rate. We also assume an adequate number of leaked objects are known to ActShare's identification algorithm in the event of a leakage. More details about ActShare's constraints will be discussed in Section VIII.
III. ACTSHARE OVERVIEW
Our proposed system functions by allocating data objects by data's identifying attribute across receivers with Oblivious Transfer (OT). The use of OT prevents the sender from fully knowing the allocation result, so the sender cannot easily frame a receiver. During the sharing, the whole process will be logged immutably into a ledger, preventing any party from denying or lying about the data allocation. In the event of a data leakage, ActShare can identify all leakers with high accuracy by reversely inferring leakers' knowledge from the leaked data.
ActShare consists of three main components.
1. Data Object Allocation. In ActShare, the allocation of data objects is accomplished by the data sender and the oblivious sharing. In particular, the sender will first organize the original dataset into data objects identified by their identifying attribute and then prepare the objects for each receiver. After that, a form of OT is applied for the sender to share specific collection of objects to each receiver. As a result of the allocation process, each receiver will get their specific collection of data objects and the allocation result keeps unknown to every party in the system. Ledger-based Sharing Logging During the data sharing, the sender and the involved receiver will log their network communication into a ledger. More specifically, when a party receives a message from the other side, it will hash the received message with its own randomness, digitally sign the hash, and then append the signed hash with some meta information into the ledger. The ledger provides high data availability and immutability of the logged information. The result of using a ledger is that the entire sharing process is logged. These logs will be referred by the leaker identification algorithm when a data leakage happens. In a data leakage, an arbitrator (e.g., a court, a notary office, or even a smart contract) will trigger the leaker identification process. In the leaker identification, all the involved parties provide the arbitrator with their received data objects and the keying material used in OT. The arbitrator confirms their claimed objects by checking against the ledger. With all the claimed received objects verified, the arbitrator then triggers the algorithm to identify all the leakers. In detail, the algorithm will start with the hypothesis that a party is not guilty. Under this hypothesis, the algorithm uses inferential statistics to evaluate the probability of having such a leaked dataset, thus judging whether the party is guilty or not.
The notations used in this paper are listed in Table I . In ActShare, the data allocation is accomplished by two steps: (i) data preprocessing and (ii) oblivious sharing between the sender and receivers. The preprocessing is to organize the original dataset into objects by data's identifying attribute(s) and further divide the objects into an Exclusive Objects (EO) and a Common Objects (CO). As indicated by its name, each object in EO is assigned to a specific receiver while objects in CO will be shared with all the receivers. This step is solely done by the data sender. The second step is to transfer the data objects from the sender to each receiver with OT.
After the data allocation, each receiver's data objects have the following two properties. to data manipulation operations unless the attackers entirely strip or distort identifying attributes from the received data.
A. Data Preprocessing
In order to turn raw data (e.g., database, key-value storage) into objects, the sender first needs to select the identifying attributes as the basis of the organization. Considering a dataset that contains identifiable information, there are two possible scenarios: there exists a single identifying attribute or multiple identifying attributes. In the first scenario, the single attribute will be selected as the basis, while in the second case, a concatenation of all the identifying attributes should be used. For example, in the Netflix Prize Data [20] , there exists one single identifying attribute, movie name/ID, and thus it can be used to identify objects ( Figure 4) . As another example, in the Patient Heart Disease Data [14] , each patient entry contains a Social Security Number (SSN) and the patient's full name. In this case, the sender should use SSN and the full name ( Figure 4 ) together as the basis of classification so that even when a leaker strips one attribute, ActShare can still match the objects by checking the other attribute. Using identifying attributes as the basis, the sender then organizes the original data into objects and further into EO and CO. This process is shown in Figure 3 . To divide the data objects into EO and CO, the sender will first randomly shuffle the objects and allocate the first u×N objects as EO while the rest as CO. In EO, each u number of objects is specifically assigned to each receiver. In ActShare, u is a configurable parameter and it can be zero, that is, letting all the data objects be in CO.
B. Oblivious Sharing
Once finishing the preprocessing, the sender will share u objects from EO and |Data| − uN objects from CO to each receiver using the Oblivious Transfer (OT). During this process, data objects will be further allocated by OT and the final allocation keeps unknown to the sender, thus preventing the sender from framing an innocent receiver.
An OT protocol is a cryptographic protocol in which the sender transfers many pieces of information to a receiver but remains oblivious to which piece has been received. At the same time, the receiver learns nothing but the selected information. In a classic 1-out-of-2 OT, the sender inputs two messages m 0 and m 1 while the receiver has a secret bit b ∈ {0, 1}. The receiver will learn m b while b keeps unknown to the sender at the end of the OT. A 1-out-of-2 OT can be extended to a more general k-out-of-n OT where the receiver can select k out of total n messages.
In ActShare's design, the OT is used as a black box and it can be replaced by any other constructions of OT or OT extension. In this paper, we use the 1-out-of-2 OT [7] (hereafter called Simple OT) proposed by Tung et. al as an example to illustrate the sharing process. For each receiver, the sender first prepares all the data objects to send, including u objects from EO and |Data| − uN objects from CO. Then the sender randomly shuffles these objects and groups these objects into a number of pairs < m 0 , m 1 >, where m 0 and m 1 contain the same number of objects and are the same in size (bit padding can be used here). Using M to represent the number of pairs, the sender generates 2M AES keys and encrypts m 0 and m 1 with two AES keys AesK 0 and AesK 1 respectively. As shown in Figure 5 , for each pair, the sender then obliviously transfers AesK 0 and AesK 1 to the receiver. After that, the receiver can only decrypt m b based on its choice b ∈ {0, 1} while the sender cannot learn the value of b. Such OT will be repeated for M times in total to finish the data sharing. Importantly, during the sharing, the keying material used in OT should be kept by both sides. In detail, the sender should keep the original data objects, AesK 0 , AesK 1 , and x (red rectangles in Figure 5 ) while the receiver should keep the copy of b and y (blue rectangles in Figure 5 ). As a result of the oblivious sharing, data objects are further allocated among all the receivers. Specifically, using k-out-of-n OT, each receiver will randomly receive about k n of u objects from EO and k n of |Data| − uN objects from CO. Because of the random shuffle and k-out-of-n OT, (i) each receiver will have a different object collection, (ii) each collection contains some objects that are never received by any other receivers, and (iii) the combination of any number of collections is also identifiable. These properties will be later utilized in ActShare's leaker identification.
V. USE OF LEDGER IN ACTSHARE
In ActShare system, the ledger provides strong evidence of what objects have been shared, ensuring non-repudiation and making the leaker identification results more reliable. To be more specific, during ActShare's oblivious data sharing, involved parties will append the keyed hash of received messages as receipts into the ledger. The ledger will immutably keep the logged information and at the same time, provide high data availability. When a data breach occurs, logged information will be referred to prevent any party from denying or lying.
A. Design of the Ledger
In this work, we present a proof-of-concept ledger based on a private blockchain, which is called ActShare ledger. The blockchain is shared among the sender, receivers, and/or third parties (e.g., a court, a notary office) through a simple broadcast protocol. Since it is controlled within a closed circle and is not designed for a cryptocurrency, there is no need for a wasteful consensus function like Proof-of-Work (PoW). Instead, in this work, we take a similar design to Proof-ofAuthentication [32] , [33] proposed by Z. Zhang et. al, where a digital signature is attached to each block in the chain. To this end, each block contains three components: (i) a hash value of its payload as the block ID, (ii) the payload which contains the logged data, the ID of the preceding block, and the meta information (e.g., producer ID, timestamp, etc.) (iii) a signature over the block ID, which is generated by block producer's private key. The validation of a block is to ensure the correctness of the ID and the validity of the signature.
When the ledger is running, a simple gating function is used in the following way. Given that the ledger is used by a limited number of parties and new blocks come only during the sharing between the sender and a receiver, we simply let the sender trigger each round of block appending. Specifically, there are four steps.
1) When the sender is ready to share its data with a receiver, the sender broadcasts a notification to all the parties so as to clear the channel. 2) Subsequently, when the receiver or the sender receives a message, it appends the receipt into the ledger by broadcasting its record to all the involved parties.
3) Once the sharing is finished, the sender broadcasts another notification. 4) After that, other parties can optionally append witness blocks whose logged data is empty, serving as a witness of the sharing, thus increasing the immutability of logged data.
In case of any number of simultaneous new blocks, the block signed by a party with a higher user ID (the highest ID number subjects to the smallest ID) will be adopted as the next official block.
When receivers' privacy is a concern (e.g., receivers may be business competitors), pseudo names can be used in order to hide the real world identities of the receivers. Also, wellknown public key pairs should also be avoided. Under this background, the sender can play the role of a central trust anchor, through which each receiver registers a pseudo name with a newly generated key pair. A receiver can also learn other receivers' certificates from the sender so that the receiver can successfully verify other receivers' blocks.
B. Logging the Data Sharing with the Ledger
In the data allocation phase, both the sender and receivers need to log their communication into the ledger as immutable receipts. Specifically, whenever the sender or a receiver receives a message from the other side, it calculates the message digest with a keyed hash function. The key used in hash is a piece of randomness created by each party. Using the data sharing example shown in Figure 5 , when a receiver gets E 0 , E 1 , and X from the sender, the receiver will calculate the message digest over these three values with a keyed hash function, e.g., HMAC. After that, the receiver generates a new block by (i) generating the payload with the receipt, the identifier of the latest block in the ledger, and the meta information, (ii) calculating the hash of the payload as the block identifier, and (iii) appending a digital signature over identifier into the block. With the newly generated block, the receiver broadcasts this block to all the involved receivers. Similarly, when the sender receives the reply from the receiver, it also generates a new block and appends it to the block by broadcast. Both the sender and receiver keep their keys used in the keyed hash secretly unless in the leaker identification in the event of a data leakage.
C. Analysis: Log Immutability and Availability
In this section, we provide rationales for why our proofof-concept ledger can provide immutability and availability of the logged information.
The ledger provides data immutability through blocks that are signed and chained together. The content of each block is protected by the producer's digital signature, and therefore no party can modify the logged information other than the producer itself. Furthermore, when a party appends a new block into the ledger, by the design of the blockchain, it locks the previous records by the hash chain: unless the whole change is changed together, a single change in any previous block will lead to broken pointers in all the following blocks. These two features can successfully ensure the immutability of the data recorded in the ledger.
The ledger achieves a high data availability through data replica among involved parties. Specifically, the blockchain is shared among all the involved parties in a distributed way. Therefore, one or several node's outages will not ruin the availability of the logged data.
VI. LEAKER IDENTIFICATION AFTER DATA LEAKAGE
ActShare identifies leakers by analyzing the leaked data and finding the involved parties whose knowledge is sufficient to create such a leaked dataset.
To provide some intuitive ideas of how ActShare's identification works, we show four leakage examples in Figure 7 . The dots in the figure are the leaked data objects while each circle represents data objects received by each receiver. The intersection of circles are the objects that are received by multiple receivers. As shown, if leaked data objects are like Figure 7a where objects are uniformly distributed in receiver R 3 's circle, we can easily infer R 3 to be the leaker. When leaked objects are like Figure 7b , the sender is guilty because some leaked objects have never been received by any receiver (dots not falling into any circle). If objects are distributed in a specific section as shown in Figure 7c , it is trivial to deduce the leaked data is from Recv 1 ∩ Recv 3 ∩ Recv 2 , which means all three receivers collude in the leakage. Figure 7d is a more complicated scenario where leaked objects are all from Recv 1 ∩ Recv 3 but with a non-uniform distribution. Under this scenario, we can still infer that R 2 participates in the collusion because R 1 and R 3 should not have the knowledge to distinguish objects that belong to R 2 without R 2 's help.
Following this idea, the leaker identification phase in ActShare consists of three simple steps. 1) Opening Secret. The involved parties provide the arbitrator with their keying material used in OT with the randomness used in receipt logging. 2) Replaying Sharing. With the opened parameters, the arbitrator is able to replay the sharing process between the sender and any receiver and confirm the obtained results with the logged information in the ledger. 3) Identifying Leakers. After replaying the sharing process, the arbitrator knows the exact allocation of data objects among receivers. According to the knowledge used to construct the leaked data, ActShare evaluates the innocence of every involved party and identifies the leaker(s) with a very low error rate.
The first two steps are to ensure that the arbitrator can get the correct information of the sender and each receiver's knowledge while the third step is to identify the leakers based on each involved party's knowledge.
Since the first two steps are straightforward, for the remaining of this section, we will describe the third step: given the exact data allocation, how to (i) identify a non-collusive leaker (the sender or a receiver), and (ii) identify all the collusive leakers.
A. Identifying Non-collusive Leakers
Algorithm Summary ActShare takes the following steps to identify each non-collusive leaker, which can be the sender or a receiver.
1) The algorithm first figures out each receiver's (i) unique data objects that are never received by other receivers and (ii) the objects that are dropped during the OT. 2) For each receiver, the algorithm detects (i) the overlap between leaked objects and unique objects and (ii) the overlap between leaked objects and dropped objects. If the first is nonempty but the second is empty, we consider this receiver guilty. 3) Finally, to verify the sender's honesty, the algorithm calculates the objects that are only known to the sender (i.e., not received by any receiver). If there exists an overlap between sender-only objects and leaked objects, we consider the sender guilty.
Algorithm Rationales Based on the data objects allocation, both the sender and each receiver have a number of objects that are never received by any other parties, and therefore these objects can serve as the clue of non-collusive leakers (the sender or non-collusive receivers). We use U nique i to represent the objects that are only received by a receiver R i and SenderOnly to refer to those objects that are not received by any receiver. Moreover, objects dropped by each receiver R i during the OT , which are denoted by Drop i , are not known to any party.
Therefore, we have the following statements hold when there is no collusion. Firstly, R i is a leaker by a large probability if leaked data objects Data contain objects that are also in U nique i but no objects from Drop i . Specifically, U nique i can be calculated by
Secondly, S must be a leaker if Data contains objects from SenderOnly. Specifically, from the data allocation process, we have:
where EO i represents the u exclusive objects allocated to R i .
Pseudo Code and Proof Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code of the ActShare's algorithm of non-collusive leaker identification.
We prove the effectiveness of the Algorithm 1 here. Specifically, we first prove that in a non-collusive leakage, leaker's unique objects can be observed by a high probability (Lemma VI.1 and Lemma VI.2) with an adequate number of leaked data objects. Based on this, we prove the algorithm can successfully identify the non-collusive leakers with a high success rate.
Lemma VI.1. If there exists a non-collusive guilty receiver R i and |Data | leaked objects are found, Data will contain objects from U nique i with a probability P as shown in Equation (6.1.3). 
Add S into L Add S into L 15: end if Proof: Because there is no collusion, R i has no idea that which objects are in U nique i , so we can consider that Data contains objects randomly from U nique i and Recv i − U nique i . Therefore, we have the probability of "at least one object of leaked dataset Data is in U nique i " to be:
According to the data allocation process, when a k-out-of-n OT is being used, we have
where N is the total number of receivers, and u is the size of objects form EO that are only allocated to R i .
Importantly, P is large enough even when R i only leaks a small portion of data objects from Recv i . For example, using 1-out-of-2 OT and with 3 receivers in total, when M = 20000 and u = 0, the probability P exceeds 99.99% even when R i leaks 1% of its received data (i.e., 100 data objects). Therefore it is strong enough to believe the detection results.
Lemma VI.2. If there exists a non-collusive guilty sender S and |Data | leaked objects are found, Data will contain objects from SenderOnly with a probability P as shown in Equation (6.1.4). If S leaks enough data objects, the leaked data will contain SenderOnly.
Proof:
The proof is the same as Lemma VI.1. Using a k-out-of-n OT, the possibility for S to successfully remove all the SenderOnly data objects is
where M is the size of all the data objects and l is size of leaked dataset Data . According to the data allocation process, we have:
Similarly, P is large enough even when S only leaks a small portion of data objects from Data.
Theorem VI.3. Algorithm 1 can identify all non-collusive leakers with success rate shown in Equation (6.1.3) and Equation (6.1.4).
Proof: Code line 4-11 is to identify non-collusive guilty receivers and line 12-15 is to identify a guilty sender. According to Lemma VI.1 and Lemma VI.2, Algorithm 1 can detect the sender with success rate shown in Equation (6.1.4) and detect the non-collusive receiver with success rate shown in Equation (6.1.3).
B. Identifying Collusive Leakers
Algorithm Summary ActShare identifies collusive leakers by the following steps.
1) The algorithm first represent all the data objects with a vector, in which each index represents a description (called a pattern) of each receiver's state of receipt and the value of each element represents the number of objects that fall into this set. Similarly, the algorithm transforms all leaked objects with another vector. 2) For each receiver, the algorithm then infers whether this receiver contributed to the collusive leakage by comparing the leaked-object vector with the all-object vector with a statistical test called binomial test. Through the comparison, the object distribution in leaked-object vector should not be significantly different from that in all-object vector if this receiver does not contributed to the leakage.
Algorithm Rationales
In a more complicated scenario where multiple receivers collude, the leaked data can still reflect leakers' knowledge because the leakers cannot know the data objects received by honest receivers. Following this principle, ActShare is able to identify all leakers by the following checking. For every single party R i , if it contribute nothing to the collusion, the leaked objects that are in Recv i and not in Recv i should satisfy an expected distribution. For example, the distribution should be statistically close to 1:1 when 1-out-of-2 OT is used in the sharing. If there is a significant difference from the expectation, R i should be a collusive leaker.
To facilitate the explanation of the algorithm, we first introduce the Pattern Matrix P at [2 N ] [N ], where each row in the matrix is the reverse binary expression of its row index. Therefore, a Pattern Matrix is like:
In each row j, we define a single element P at By transforming the whole dataset and the leaked dataset into Dataset Vectors V and V, V can reflect the object distribution of the leaked dataset while V provides the expected object distribution between any two paired patterns. Importantly, for two paired index k and k on receiver R i , if R i makes no contribution to the leakage,
In order to scientifically measure whether the difference is significant enough, we employ a statistic test, binomial test [26] , to obtain the p-value [30] . Here, p-value indicates the probability of having V [k] : V [k ] under the hypothesis that R i is honest. When p-value is less than a pre-defined value α (e.g., α = 0.05), it is considered that the hypothesis does not hold and thus R i contributed to the leakage.
As mentioned, a noteworthy fact is that ActShare cannot identify a corrupted receiver when this receiver makes no contribution to the leakage, that is, other corrupted parties can still have sufficient knowledge to make such a leaked dataset even without this receiver's participation.
Pseudo Code and Proof Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo code of the ActShare's identification algorithm for collusive leakers.
Algorithm 2 Leakers identifying algorithm.

Require:
1: Leaked data objects 2: The allocation of all the data objects for k from 1 to 2 N do
9:
Find k which is paired with k 10:
11:
if p value i < α then
Add R i into L 
Now we prove the effectiveness of Algorithm 2 with a brief proof. Specifically, we first prove that when a receiver contributed to the leakage, its contribution can be reflected by the object distribution of two paired elements in Dataset Vector (Lemma VI.4). After that, we can prove the correctness of Algorithm 2 (Theorem VI.5).
Let V be the Data Vector for the leaked dataset and let V be the Data Vector for all the data objects. Proof: We give a proof by contradiction. Assuming R i does not contributed to the leakage, since the corrupted receivers cannot know Recv i , their leaked data randomly contains both objects received and not received by R i . Importantly, the distribution of objects in V The error rate is the probability that a significant difference exists when R i is honest, which is represented by the p-value obtained from the binomial test.
Theorem VI.5. Algorithm 2 can identify all the collusive receivers with accuracy obtained in code line 18.
Proof: In Algorithm 2, line 15 to line 22 is to check whether there exists a paired k and k whose distribution in V has a significant difference from V for receiver R i , . According to Lemma VI.4, each corrupted receiver who contributed to the leakage can be identified with an error rate to be the pvalue. Therefore, for each identified corrupted leaker j, the probability of giving the correct result is 1 − pvalue j , where pvalue j is the smallest p-value among all the p-values for each ¡k, k'¿ pair in which a significant distribution difference is observed. The accuracy for the whole algorithm is the probability that the algorithm make a right identification on each captured party, and therefore the accuracy should be
where L is the set of all leakers captured by Algorithm 2.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate ActShare with the prototype implementation of ActShare's knowledge-based algorithm and the simulation of the data allocation in terms of the following two aspects.
1) We evaluate ActShare's effectiveness in identifying leakers
in different scenarios: a non-collusive guilty receiver, a guilty sender, and a group of collusive parties. 2) We formally describe the data loss caused by ActShare's allocation and investigate the impact of loss using Heart Disease Data [14] and OpenFlight Data [21] .
It shows that with total 20,000 objects and 6 receivers, ActShare is able to identify all the leakers with accuracy more than 99.99% in any scenarios if more than 5% of the objects are leaked and used in the identification algorithm. With Heart Disease Data and OpenFlight Data, we utilized existing analyzing approaches to process a full-size dataset and a dataset obtained after ActShare's allocation. Our simulation shows that similar results can be observed with two different datasets.
A. Accurate Leaker Identification
We first evaluate ActShare's performance by changing the quantity of leaked objects used by ActShare. At the same time, we fix the total numbers of data objects and receivers, and use the most well-studied 1-out-of-2 OT in the sharing.
Evaluation Settings
We let the value of |Data| be 20,000, the total number of receivers N be 6, and u = 0. In the data sharing phase, 1-out-of-2 OT is used in the evaluation. We evaluate ActShare's detection algorithm in the cases of a single non-collusive guilty receiver, a guilty sender, and a group of collusive leakers, respectively. Specifically, in the collusive leakage scenario, we evaluate the detection when two, three, and six collusive receivers. In each case, we randomly try three different types of dataset combinations, which consist of one or more intersection, complement, and union operations.
Plot Notation The x axis indicates the fraction of the leaked data objects over a leaker's dataset or a processed dataset made by collusive receivers. Specifically, we formally describe the meaning of x using x = 0.01 as an example.
• In a non-collusive leakage, it means 1% of guilty receiver's objects Recv i are leaked and used in ActShare to identify the leakers.
• In the case of a guilty sender, it means 1% of the common objects are leaked and used in ActShare to identify the leakers.
• As for a collusive leakage, x = 0.01 means 1% objects from the combined dataset (e.g., after a set of collusive operations) are leaked and used in ActShare.
Therefore, in the collusive leakage, the fraction is smaller than the fraction of leaked objects of each receiver's data objects. The y axis indicates the error rate of the detection results. Error rate 1 means the number of leaked objects is not sufficient for the identification algorithm to identify the leaker(s) while error rate 0 indicates that the algorithm can identify all the leakers undoubtedly. In the plots, we let the maximum accuracy precision to 99.999999%, in other words, the minimize error rate is 1 × 10 −8 .
Evaluation Results
As shown in Figure 8 , we confirm that the more data is leaked and used in ActShare, the higher identification accuracy is in all three scenarios (i.e., a noncollusive guilty receiver, a guilty sender, collusive parties). In Figure 8a and Figure 8b , we can observe similar identification accuracy in both cases. This is because when u = 0, we have |SenderOnly| = |U nique i | for any i < N and the difference comes as the result of the definition of leakage ratio: a receiver's ratio denominator is |Recv i | while the sender's ratio denominator is the quantity of all data objects. In Figure 8c , it shows that when number of collusive receivers increases, there is only a slight decrease in the detection accuracy. It's because when more receivers contribute to the leakage, the combined dataset usually becomes smaller in size, e.g., Recv 1 ∩ Recv 2 has a bigger size than Recv 1 ∩ Recv 2 ∩ Recv 3 . Moreover, we find the accuracy will not change much when different types of combination operations are made in the collusive leakage.
As a summary, with 20,000 data objects and 6 receivers, we observe that ActShare's detection can accurately identify all the guilty parties even when 5% objects are used in ActShare.
B. The Impact of ActShare: Use Data Analysis As Examples
Inevitably caused by the allocation, ActShare will reduce the dataset from its original size to the size of Received i for each receiver. According to the allocation process, we can represent the data loss in the allocation by the following equation.
As an example, with 1-out-of-2 OT and u = 0, each receiver will receive 1 2 of the whole dataset. An OT with a higher k n will lead to a lower data loss.
In this section, we investigate the impact of data loss caused by ActShare's allocation. However, given that each real world dataset is very various in their size, quality, and other features, it is impossible to investigate the impact of the data loss on the received data's value. Therefore, in this work, we use data analysis as an example application scenario. We select The first dataset is Patient Heart Disease data [14] provided by UCI. The original Heart Disease data contains patients' SSNs and full names as the identifiable information, but these attributes have been stripped in the public available version for privacy concerns. For the purpose of evaluation, we add back these two attributes with randomly generated values. Identified by SSN and full name, the dataset contain about 300 data objects in total, which is a very small dataset and the analysis results are supposed to be more sensitive to the size of the data. In our evaluation, we perform the disease prediction analysis using the existing analysis mechanisms [15] and compare the analysis results obtained from a full-size dataset and a dataset obtained from the sharing simulation with 1-out-of-2 OT and u = 0. The analysis tools used in the evaluation are based on common classification algorithms in machine learning, including Linear Regression (LR), k-nearest neighbors algorithm (KNN), Support Vector Machine (SVN), Naive Bayes (NB), Decision Tree (DT), and Random Forest (RF). As shown in Figure 9 , even though the total data objects are small in size, the analysis can still give the similar results with a difference between 0.5% to 6% using a half-size dataset.
The second is the Worldwide Flight Route data [21] from OpenFlights.org. Each row in this database contains a departure airport name/ID and an arrival airport name/ID of the route, serving as the identifying attributes used in ActShare. In contrast with the small heart disease dataset, Flight Route data is large in its number of data objects (more than 67k routes and 6k airlines). Similarly, using existing analysis tools [18] , we perform airport analysis based on a full-size dataset and a half-size dataset obtained from the ActShare simulation. As shown in Figure 10 , the analysis results on both full-size data and the processed data are the same about the top 10 busiest airline hubs, while the density obtained from the processed data is 48% -52% of the density obtained from the raw data. This is expected because a half-size dataset is used.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Basic Trade-off: Identification Accuracy v.s. Data Loss
The principle of our proposed work is to distinguish each receiver's dataset via allocation and a fundamental trade-off is between ActShare's identification accuracy and the data loss. In detail, the larger the data loss is, the more differentiation each receiver's data objects will carry and consequently the more accurate the identification will be. The optimal balance in the trade-off is to (i) control the data loss so that the received dataset is sufficient to achieve the application goals (e.g., data analysis) and at the same time, (ii) the differentiation among receiver's objects are large enough for ActShare to identify the leakers.
As investigated in Section VII-B, the number of data objects received by each receiver mainly depends on the size of u and the form of OT. Also, by properly setting the parameters in ActShare, a good balance can be found that achieves both acceptable received data size and good detection accuracy. To this end, in the next subsection, we evaluated ActShare by the simulation using different forms of OT and different u. 
B. System Sensitivity to Configuration Parameters
In the design of ActShare, there are two configuration parameters. One is which form of OT to use and the other one is the value of u, which is the number of exclusive objects for each receiver. To learn how these two parameters will affect the performance of ActShare, we perform a number of simulation of ActShare using three different forms of OT: 1-out-of-2 OT, 2-out-of-3 OT, 3-out-of-4 OT and four different values of u: 0, 100, 300, and 1000. In the simulation, we set the number of receivers to 6 and total data objects to 20,000.
As shown in Figure 11 , in the case of a single receiver leakage (Figure 11a ) or a sender leakage (Figure 11b ), an OT with a higher k n results in lower identification accuracy. This is expected because ActShare identifies each non-collusive leaker by its unique objects. To be more specific, according to the equations of |U nique i | and |SenderOnly| shown in the proofs of Lemma VI.1 and VI.2, when a higher k n is used, less objects are unique to each receiver and the sender, thus resulting in a lower identification accuracy. The decrease can be explained: when there is a large k n and only a small percentage of objects are leaked, there is a non-negligible chance that none of unique objects are included in the leaked objects. For example, using a 3-out-of-4 OT, only when more than about 40% of the objects are leaked and used by ActShare, the accuracy of identifying a non-collusive guilty receiver becomes larger than 99%. As is noticed, SenderOnly drops much faster than U nique i , and thus the accuracy decrease is more obvious in Figure 11b . However, as observed, under the circumstance of a collusion leakage, the higher the OT's k n is, the higher the detection accuracy is. This is because with a higher k n , each receiver receives more data objects and each combination will contain more objects, making the statistical difference between sample and expectation more significant.
Regarding the impact of value of u, as shown in Figure 12 , in the scenario of a guilty sender (Figure 12b ), the identification accuracy goes lower while in other scenarios (Figure 12a and Figure 12b ), a higher u leads to a higher accuracy of the identification result. It's because a higher u makes each receiver obtain more unique objects and the size of receiver's total objects also becomes larger, helping ActShare to identify non-collusive guilty receivers and collusive receivers. On the other hand, since u's value is much smaller than the size of Common Objects (CO), the size of SenderOnly becomes smaller as u becomes larger. Therefore it is harder to identify a guilty sender.
From the above simulation on the impact of OT and u, it shows when an OT with a higher k n is used, it becomes less accurate to identify a guilty non-collusive receiver or a guilty sender, but by properly setting the value of u, such accuracy loss can be compensated.
C. The Overhead of ActShare
In ActShare, without using OT extensions, M times of OT is needed to obliviously transfer M pairs of < m 0 , m 1 > to a receiver. The value of M depends on two factors: (i) the total number of objects to transfer to each receiver, which is u + |Data| − uN and (ii) the number of objects contained in each pair. Considering each pair < m 0 , m 1 > only contains two objects (i.e., m 0 and m 1 are two data objects), we have . Correspondingly, we can obtain Table II . As shown, the numbers of OTs, AES encryption operations, and the round trip times with Simple OT [7] are all linear to the quantity of data objects. As an optimization, the value of M can be greatly reduced by utilizing OT extensions [13] , [16] , [3] , [4] or increasing the size of objects contained in each pair. 
, N is the total number of receivers By the pseudo code in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, the complexity of ActShare's identification algorithm is dominated by the total number of receivers as listed in Table II .
D. Investigate the Assumption of Adequate Data Objects
In this section, we investigate the relationship between ActShare's performance and the adequacy of the data objects, which is the third assumption as listed in Section II.
The word "adequacy" has two meanings in this assumption. First, an adequate number of leaked objects are discovered and used in ActShare's identification process. In Section VII, we have revealed the relationship between identification accuracy and the number of leaked objects used in the algorithm.
The second meaning is that there are adequate data objects to allocate among the receivers. Like all the other allocationbased leaker identification mechanisms, ActShare will inevitably lead to data loss in each receiver's data due to the allocation. When there are many receivers or very few data objects, each receiver will get a small number of objects after the allocation. In Section VII, we have formally defined the data loss in ActShare. In this section, we further investigate ActShare with inadequate data objects for allocation. Specifically, we make the number inadequate by adding more receivers in the simulation. Similar to the previous simulation setting, we set the total object number to 20,000, the OT to 1-out-of-2 OT, and u to 0. As shown in Figure 13 , when there are totally 3, 6, and 9 receivers, the error rate goes higher when the total receiver number is larger. Under the circumstance of 3 collusive leakers out of 9 receivers, ActShare can identify the leakers with accuracy more than 99%, only when about 30% objects are used in the algorithm.
E. Collusion Between the Sender and Receivers
So far, we haven't elaborated the case when the sender colludes with one or more receivers. This is because ActShare can identify all the leakers who have contributed to the leakage, including the leaker. Specifically, there are two possible situations in such collusion.
1) The sender contributes to the leakage. However, the only contribution that the sender can make are the objects that are not received by its associates (the collusive receivers) due to the sender's limited knowledge. For example, when the sender S and receivers R 1 and R 2 colludes, what S knows more than R 1 and R 2 are the objects in Data − Recv 1 ∪ Recv 2 . Therefore, the leakage will contain objects from the sender in this case. By the Lemma VI.2, there is a large chance that leaked objects overlap SenderOnly and thus the sender will be captured by Algorithm 1. At the same time, all corrupted receivers who contributed to the leakage, can also be captured by Algorithm 2. 2) The sender does not contribute to the leakage, under which, there is no need (and it is difficult) to capture the sender. The real leakers who contributed to the leakage can be captured by Algorithm 2.
Moreover, when a sender colludes with one or more receivers, they still cannot frame other receivers because they have no knowledge of others' data objects due to ActShare's oblivious sharing.
IX. RELATED WORK
Data leakage problem has been explored for years [27] , [8] . Past works in this domain cover the leakage prevention, leakage detection, and leaker identification. In terms of the media of information, the existing works have covered structured data (e.g., rational database, spreadsheets), textual data (e.g., contracts, reports), and multimedia (e.g., images, video).
Our work focuses on the leaker identification problem in identifiable information leakage, which is under the category of structured data. Existing leaker identification solutions to the same issue can be divided into two big categories: (i) data watermarking, and (ii) data object allocation across receivers.
A. Watermarking
In the first category [12] , the data sender alters the noisetolerant attributes or embeds hidden information into the data before sending it to each receiver so that each distributed copy is watermarked. By associating the watermark contained in the leaked data with the receivers, the data sender is able to identify the guilty party. This scheme was first proposed by Agrawal et al. [2] , [1] and was further explored in later works [28] , [31] , [24] , [25] , [34] , [11] , [5] .
However, as pointed out in many existing works [2] , [12] , [5] , it is hard to effectively make a watermark on structured data, because it is trivial for attackers to further alter the structured data to spoil the watermark compared with other types of media. For example, an attacker may undermine the watermark by simply removing or adding noise to certain attributes in the dataset (sometimes even without ruining the main value of the dataset). Even worse, a group of collusive parties can compare their received copies and figure out the watermarked data or the location of the hidden information. Consequently, these will lead to unexpected detection results, thus making it hard to be the evidence used in a court of law.
B. Data Object Allocation
First proposed in Panagiotis and Hector's work [22] , [23] , the second category allocates data objects among receivers so that each receiver will obtain a different data object collection from others. When leaked data is found, the sender can utilize the receiver-objects mapping to evaluate each receiver's probability of data leaking. Fake but realistic data objects can also be created to facilitate detection. Following this direction, Ishu and Ashutosh proposed a guilt detection mechanism [10] that uses directed bigraph to allocate data objects to receivers.
However, existing allocation mechanisms also have several issues when used in the real world. First of all, the allocation can be disrupted by data manipulation and collusion among receivers, by which corrupted receivers can learn the allocation and circumvent the detection by leaking the common objects. To be more specific, a leaker can add noise to each data objects so that each object becomes less identifiable by the sender. Furthermore, multiple receivers can even collude together and strip the special data objects that are used to uniquely identify each receiver.
Secondly, existing allocation approaches didn't consider the scenario where the data sender itself may leak the data intentionally or unintentionally. This leads to several issues that hurt the usability and reliability of existing systems. For example, the sender can frame a receiver because it knows this receiver's data and thus can leak those data on purpose. Similarly, a guilty receiver can also blame the sender when a data breach happens.
Furthermore, rare existing systems provide the evidence of the data sharing process, and thus involved parties may deny what has been received/shared to escape their responsibilities when data is leaked.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work, we study the leaker identification problem in data sharing with identifiable information, and propose ActShare, a data sharing system with reliable leaker identification. Compared with the existing solutions, ActShare allocates data objects obliviously across receivers, immutably logs the sharing process, and accurately identifies leakers with a knowledge-based algorithm. The use of OT prevents the sender from knowing the exact allocation of data objects to individual receivers, and immutable logging of the entire data sharing process provides undeniable evidence of received data objects. In the event of a data breach, ActShare can accurately identify all the leakers using ActShare 's knowledge-based algorithm even when guilty parties leak only a modest number of objects. Moreover, we also use data analysis as an example to show that the data size reduction caused by ActShare is controllable and has limited impact on the data value.
Our work shows that building accountability (proactive security) into the data sharing can greatly facilitate the leaker identification in case of a data leakage. This will in turn prevent malicious parties from illegally selling or disclosing sensitive information. Our design also suggests that there is an urgent need for a ledger system to keep immutable records; however, existing cloud-based systems lack the immutability support while popular distributed ledger systems used in cryptocurrencies are too costly to be feasible. We leave as our future work the design of a general-purpose distributed ledger and sharing of more generic datasets (may or may not contain identifying attributes).
